Implementing ‘Prevent’ in countering violent extremism in the UK: a left-realist critique by Abbas, Tahir
  
Tahir Abbas 
Implementing ‘Prevent’ in countering 
violent extremism in the UK: a left-realist 
critique 
 




Abbas, Tahir (2018) Implementing ‘Prevent’ in countering violent extremism in the UK: a left-




© 2018 SAGE Publications 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/91675 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: January 2019 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
  
Implementing ‘Prevent’ in Countering Violent Extremism in the UK: 








This paper attempts to situate the UK ‘Prevent’ policy debate in the wider framework of 
the global Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) paradigm that emerged in late 2015. By 
omitting a nuanced approach to the social, cultural, economic and political 
characteristics of the radicalised, there is a tendency to introduce blanket measures that 
inadvertently and indirectly lead to harm. Moreover, although ‘Prevent’ has been the 
outward-facing component of the UK government’s counter-extremism strategy since 
2006, it conflates legitimate political resistance among young British Muslims as 
indications of violent extremism, providing credence to the argument that ‘Prevent’ is a 
form of social control, ultimately mollifying resistance by re-affirming the status quo on 
domestic and foreign policy. In this vicious circle, ‘Prevent’ can unintentionally add to 
structural and cultural Islamophobia, which are amplifiers of both Islamist as well as far 
right radicalisation. ‘Safeguarding’ vulnerable young people is imperative in this social 











The events of 9/11 and subsequent occurrences of terrorism, political violence and violent 
extremism linked to Islamic radicalism across the world, especially during the period of the 
rise and fall of Islamic State (2015-2017), have created new challenges without obvious 
answers. Since the 2015 United Nations General Assembly, many governments have 
introduced the ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE) policy paradigm in an effort to 
‘prevent’, disrupt and generate a counter-narrative to avert, intervene or build community 
resilience against instances of violent extremism. As the concept’s reach has grown, this 
policy, known as ‘Prevent’ in the UK, aims to protect against ‘would-be terrorists’ based on 
various assumptions about the sociological, psychological or behavioural characteristics of 
the ‘radicalised’ (Coppock and McGovern, 2014). However, ‘Prevent’ is not without its 
critics in academia (Kundnani, 2014; Mastroe, 2016), the education sector (Bouattia, 2015) or 
among civil society groups (CAGE, 2016). The UK government, led by the Home Office, 
remains steadfast in rolling out ‘Prevent’, including introducing the Prevent Duty in 2015 to 
cover a whole host of public sector organisations, in particular in education and health 
(Blackbourn and Walker, 2016). It is now law for these and other public sector bodies to 
ensure they tackle the threats of violent extremism, including reporting on visible differences 
in appearance among young people, as it is regarded as indication of radicalisation in 
particular instances (HMSO, 2015). However, the policy limits opportunities for building 
trust and engagement. It also provides succour to far right extremist movements that escalates 
due to how the policy has prioritised Muslim groups. It also contributes to Islamophobia – 
both a consequence and a driver of hate, intolerance and violent extremism. 
 
This paper explores CVE in general and ‘Prevent’ in particular, discussing the sociological, 
political and cultural limits of the paradigm in the UK based on a left-realist critical 
criminology perspective. The theory originated in the 1970s, at a time of rapid economic 
transformation due to de-industrialisation, globalisation and technological change, with 
working class and ethnic minority groups facing the brunt of decline (Young, 1999). These 
outcomes also affected hegemonic masculinity (Dekeseredy and Schwartz, 2010), through 
which male violence emerged as one consequence. The aim of this paper is to gauge 
perspectives on ‘Prevent’ within the wider global CVE paradigm, and the repercussions 
raised for critical criminology research in this area. In deconstructing these responses, new 
ways of addressing violent extremism must concentrate energies on localised interventions 
and engagements, depoliticising both ‘Prevent’ and CVE concepts in the process. The 
problems are local, as are the solutions. Hence, it is vital that programmatic directives do not 
define the policy approach from above – but rather through the aspirations of communities in 
specific localities in the wider struggle against radicalisation from below. British Muslim 
communities, moreover, need to take greater ownership of both the problem of and the 
solutions to violent extremism – not because Muslims and Islam are the cause of the malaise 
– but, rather, in the absence of UK government efforts to empower communities, these 
groups have only themselves to rely on. This is an uneasy task in the current climate of the 
general disconnect between British Muslims and the state. 
 
First, the nature, extent and limit of ‘Prevent’ is discussed, in particular the state-community 
relations gaps that emerge and the implications raised for the delivery and effectiveness of the 
policy at a conceptual, theoretical and empirical level. It addresses the issues of politicisation, 
evoking the suggestion that the policy approach has the unintended impact of making worse 
the very problems it seeks to ameliorate – that is, radicalisation leading to violent extremism. 
Second, since its inception, ‘Prevent’ has attempted to counter violent extremism as part of a 
wider inward- and outward-looking approach known as CONTEST. However, in certain 
instances ‘Prevent’ delivery is stigmatising British Muslims in an atmosphere of growing 
intolerance, bigotry and Islamophobia in the UK in recent periods, especially as the reality of 
a growing problem with far right radicalisation, extremism and violence becomes apparent. In 
this milieu, populism, anti-immigrant jingoism and hostility to internal ethnic differences are 
also becoming politically mainstream. Third, how ‘Prevent’ operates is based on a 
predetermined, idealised notion of ‘the Muslim’ in efforts to counter violent extremism 
enhances the view that the state is only interested in a particular type of Muslim. In 
conclusion, while the UK government has much information and data on the activities of 
terrorists in the UK, the academy, civil society groups and activists are unable to glean a 
detailed understanding – it, therefore, leads to many missed opportunities to improve 
engagement and impact. Considerations for further research are highlighted at the end of this 
paper. 
 
The Extent and Limit of ‘Prevent’ 
From early 2015 to late 2017, Islamic State carried out numerous acts of violent extremism 
and terrorism across the world and in the West in particular (including three in four months in 
the UK in early 2017) (Vidino et al., 2017). Historically, ‘war on terror’ deradicalisation 
policy has concentrated on religion and ideology as both the cause of and solution to violent 
extremism. In the case of Muslim groups, the aim is to resolve problematic religiosity by 
replacing it with a moderate or a liberal Islam, in the process variously instrumentalising 
proxy actors drawn from Muslim communities. It includes those who have turned away from 
Islamic extremism or regressive Islamism, now embracing a post-modern renaissance as so-
called enlightened individuals. Key actors today include Sara Khan, Lead Commissioner for 
the Commission for Countering Extremism, which reports to the Home Office. In the recent 
past, Ed Hussain and Maajid Nawaz carried the torch for liberal ideals, principally in 
establishing The Quilliam Foundation in 2008, which was initially funded by the UK 
government to the tune of 1 million GBP. The core of counter-terrorism is to dismantle the 
mechanics involved in plots, but much of the ideological perspectives on the drivers and 
solutions to terrorism have fixated on Islam. Moreover, the reality is to securitise diversity, 
centring on deradicalisation based on the notion that individuals move from low-level to 
vociferous radicalisation and, eventually, to violence and extremism (Mythen et al., 2017). 
Radicalisers, in reality, mobilise young people attracted to unifying concepts, presented as 
empowering groups through a holistically conceptualised notion of collective identity that 
transcends national borders. By portraying their aims as addressing the wrongs that emerge 
from the post-war periods of migration and settlement of various Muslim minority groups 
hailing from lands once under colonial rule, radicalisers centre on racism, inequality, social 
division and the collapse of multiculturalism or respect for differences in society (Young, 
2007). However, extremism is a symptom, not a cause of instabilities, insecurities and 
patterns of anomie experienced by various groups. Here, religiously inspired ideology is a 
convenient umbrella – a suitable instrument of mobilisation. It is not the first point of 
departure in determining radicalisation or violent extremism, especially in the diasporic 
context, although, given the limited approach taken by the UK government, Muslim-owned 
and led deradicalisation initiatives that do not use the language CVE but offer routes to self-
empowerment arguably provide greater assistance. For example, MEND 
(Muslim Engagement and Development) and CAGE both deliver research reports, policy 
briefings and special events aimed at improving knowledge of Islamophobia and 
radicalisation from a community perspective. In recent periods, these organisations have also 
provided guidance on ‘Prevent’ in an effort to build in engagement among Muslim 
communities (MEND, 2018; CAGE, 2018). 
 
Since its inception, ‘Prevent’ has encountered various levels of criticism from actors arguing 
that its agenda is counterproductive and divisive (Archer, 2009). In 2011, the UK government 
reviewed CONTEST (counterterrorism strategy), first developed in 2003 in private but then 
publically in 2006 after the events of 7/7 (July 2005), and from which emerged the discourse 
of the ‘Prevent’ agenda. This reassessment considered countering ideology central in the 
battle against terrorism. Moreover, the legal remit of ‘Prevent’ was expanded to emphasise its 
work alongside different agencies, including health, education and social services. A youth 
element also became a feature of the policy content (HMSO, 2011). In effect, the UK 
government widened its counterterrorism strategy to target not just terrorism but also 
ideology (Richards, 2011). Consequently, ‘Prevent’ re-emphasised the dominant notion that 
individuals are necessarily on a direct path towards violent extremism as the primary 
problematic, even though the policy identified a significant conflation between social 
cohesion and counterterrorism. It led to charges of exclusivism, not inclusivism, and the 
fostering of existing divisions (Edwards, 2016). The review created two implications for 
policy. First, the importance of building resilience among communities confronted with 
radical Islamist extremist narratives. Second, the realisation of a specific policing, security 
and intelligence mandate to engage in overt and covert counterterrorism measures to establish 
counter-narrative schemes as part of the communication and information battle, and in the 
processing mitigating the nervousness among government and communities generated by the 
dissemination. While there are initiatives carried out by organisations such as ConnectJustice 
which suggest that anecdotally these initiatives make an impact, there is however limited 
independent evidence to assert that strategic communications have any effect on countering 
violent extremism at all. The latter also includes the significance of building community trust 
in policing authorities tasked with targeting areas of high Muslim residential concentration 
and other measures associated with risks of radicalisation once connected with a ‘Prevent’ 
funding model that allocated budgets based on the residential concentration levels of British 
Muslims (Murray et al., 2015). 
 
The toxicity of ‘Prevent’ is palpable (Awan, 2014). The ‘at risk’ versus ‘risky’ dichotomy 
blurs the ambiguous lines that give rise to the politicisation of radicalisation from above, the 
consequences of placing too great an emphasis on ‘Muslimness’ (Heath-Kelly, 2017) and the 
structural determinants of radicalisation from below (Lakhani, 2011; Martin, 2014). In a 
paradoxical development, the removal of ethnic inequalities from the mainstream discourse 
of diversity and difference sees ethnicity and religiosity granted specific weight in the 
counterterrorism domain (Lewis and Craig, 2014). Efforts to clarify the separation between 
social cohesion and counterterrorism add to confusion among politicians and civil servants, 
proceeding to political and policy paralysis. It intensifies an atmosphere of alarmism towards 
British Muslims, fanning the flames of far right sentiment that is based on anti-immigration, 
anti-religion and anti-multiculturalism conceptualisations – a ‘Muslim paranoia narrative’, 
which is the perspective taken by numerous governments when making counter-extremism, 
de-radicalisation or CVE policy development decisions (Aistrope, 2016). Policymakers 
maintain assumptions about Muslim communities in their countries and a hostile media and 
political discourse enhances these perspectives, deepening and widening the realities of 
Islamophobia in the process. It leads to levels of violence against British Muslims that spike 
after incidents of terrorism across the world (Hanes and Machin, 2014; Awan and Zenpi, 
2016), where Islamophobia is an increasingly accepted institutionalised norm (Warsi, 2017). 
In this charged and toxic atmosphere, relations between the state and British Muslim 
communities are restricted, reduced to a top-down system of design and delivery that is 
understood by those affected by it as well those delivering it as ideological in design and 
implementation (Thomas, 2012). 
 
The other main concern with ‘Prevent’ is the mentoring system known as Channel (Qureshi, 
2015). It implements a one-to-one methodology that works with vulnerable young people to 
educate, motivate and inspire them away from paths towards violent extremism (Powers, 
2015). The UK government argues that this system has prevented a number of young people 
from joining the Islamic State as foreign fighters. However, it is unable to permit access to 
original case files or even anonymised case material regarding particular individuals or 
groups. The Channel model is of interest to other counterterrorism agencies across the world, 
including in France and Germany, with Denmark promoting its unique mentoring approach, 
known as the ‘Aarhus model’ (Bertelsen, 2015). However, whether mentoring alone is the 
dominant enabler or if a particular mechanism associated with deradicalisation from Islamist 
extremism emerges due to Channel or other similar systems remains unclear. 
 
The Stigmatising Effects of ‘Prevent’ 
Dealing with terrorism and political violence requires introducing complex research questions 
in order to generate effective policy interventions. With so many disparaging voices on the 
UK government’s counter-extremism approach, ‘Prevent’ endures immense discussion in a 
charged intellectual, policy and community space. Ongoing concerns relate to impact and 
effectiveness, but disagreements over the efficacy of the ‘Prevent’ policy agenda also remain. 
The dominant hegemonic discourse in government policy thinking is to centre on specific 
interventions regarding British Muslims, in the process alienating a body of people unable to 
engage in the political process. For groups without the ability to be the interlocutor that 
government encourages, it raises the prospect of ‘policed multiculturalism’ (Ragazzi, 2016) 
and forced assimilation. With a persistent gaze on terrorism and radicalism, British Muslims 
are disordered and hesitant about government attempts to engage with groups through this 
lens of countering violent extremism (Sabir, 2017). However, with different groups signalling 
their interests, the ‘Prevent’ discourse is the centrifugal force underpinning these counter-
competing voices. 
 
The dominant negative discourse on religion in society, in particular among Muslim 
communities in the West, has a profound effect on stigmatising communities (Citizens UK, 
2017). First, it creates the impression that Muslim communities are homogenous, powerless 
and unable to organise themselves against violent extremism. It takes away their agency and 
narrows the lens through which state-community relations take shape. As governments in 
Western Europe and North America only wish to talk to their Muslim communities about 
terrorism and radicalisation, it disengages groups encountering various internal ethnic, 
sectarian and cultural divisions. It also raises suspicions that governments are only interested 
in a type of liberal Islam, which is pro-integration; one based on values and nurturing 
identities, rather than appreciating the structural realities affecting all marginalised 
communities. Second, the narratives of exclusion and victimisation are powerful within the 
wider context of Muslim communities in the process of integrating into majority society. 
Much evidence supports claims of exclusion and disadvantage, but it is ignored or relegated 
to the bottom of the pecking order of social policy priorities. This discourse on the ‘left 
behind’ also concerns the aspirations of former white working class communities suffering 
downward social mobility (Beider, 2015; Dorling, 2015); a well-documented issue in current 
research on social inequalities (Franz, 2015; Zelin, 2015). Many Muslim groups who came to 
the West, especially to Western Europe as part of a post-war migration process, now as third 
and fourth generations, continue to experience instances of economic and cultural alienation. 
Dominant state actors are concerned about various cultural questions within communities 
concerning such issues as the treatment of women, female genital mutilation or grooming of 
vulnerable young women. It distances a body of people looking to the state for answers to 
structural struggles that they suffer as communities within neighbourhoods. Certainly, 
analysis of social media from Islamic State challenges the assumption that religious 
narratives encouraged vulnerable young people to turn to violent Islamist radicalisation to 
generate answers to their worldly exertions. Less than ten per cent of its output referred to 
religion alone (Schuurman et al., 2016). Rather, the likes of Islamic State concentrated on 
grievances, which are rooted in the experience of Muslims in the West (and in the East). With 
relative ease, it permits radicalisers to play on the injustices of racism and exclusion as well 
as vilification in the media, political marginalisation and cultural isolation. The present 
approach to ‘Prevent’/CVE, especially in the UK and in other parts of Western Europe, runs 
the risk of reproducing the very outcomes it wishes to counter. 
 
In understanding the drivers of violent extremism among Muslim communities, and of former 
white working class communities who turn to far right extremism, the symbiotic effects of 
culture and structure, in addition to the psychological dimensions, generate a systematic 
understanding of relations between the individual, communities and of politics (Abbas, 
2017). Differences of opinion emerge between state actors and wider communities, resulting 
in politicisation and polarisation, not always prevention or protection. In the midst of 
discernible identity claims based on a sense of belonging and the need for participation, there 
are acute issues facing British Muslim groups in the current period. British Muslims look to 
the state to respond to the problems facing groups; however, the state is not returning the 
interest. It indicates institutionalised Islamophobia or anti-Muslim sentiment, which has 
surfaced as problematic outcomes of the failed ‘war on terror’ and the global ‘war on terror’ 
culture that ensues. Moreover, terrorism has not abated. From August 2014 to December 
2017, when Islamic State declared itself as the caliphate, over fifty acts of terrorism across 
the world were carried out, with Western Europe and North America on the receiving end of 
many of these attacks. No single profile identifies the archetypical terrorist. Rather, 
perpetrators are from diverse backgrounds, many of whom with numerous social, economic 
and cultural apprehensions over their existence as Western Muslims. The unmistakeable 
profile is that all of the British assailants implicated in acts of violent extremism, 
radicalisation or terrorism are products of British society (O’ Donnell, 2016). Meanwhile, 
policymakers struggle to profile the potential violent extremist. As governments endeavour to 
promote the notion that vulnerable young people are at risk of radicalisation, who then 
subsequently commits acts of violent extremism, it stigmatises an entire group, and 
disregards instances of political resistance, turning it into pre-violence extremist criminal 
thought, which is policed and securitised, in the process silencing legitimate dissent or 
criticism. 
 
Contemporary radicalisations are the reality of global issues with local reach. Radicalisers 
know that their recruitment strategies fill a vacuum, as local leaders are unable to address the 
concerns of the disaffected young, where much of radicalisation also reflects on youth 
rebellion. Broad policy measures concentrate on a narrow range of activities, adding to 
distrust, and disproportionality. It yields negative consequences due to a heavy-handed, 
universally directed approach that casts the net far too wide (Thomas, 2014). With increasing 
numbers of young Muslim teenagers vulnerable to extremism, it is notable that all were born 
since the onset of the global ‘war on terror’. 
 
Putting the Cart before the Horse 
The UK 2011 ‘Prevent’ review attempted to create distance between cohesion and 
counterterrorism, but this separation was unsuccessful due to political distancing by the 
government, merged with an element of apathy, as the emphasis was on deep cuts to public 
services and institutions in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crash. It would be too 
simplistic, however, to reduce the essential dilemma of CVE to one of a conflation between 
cohesion and counter-terrorism – as cohesion is not without its obstacles. Emerging as policy 
approach and a political discourse after the Northern Disturbances in 2001, ‘community 
cohesion’ was a flawed and unpopular approach due to its insistence on bridging social 
capital as an antidote to profound patterns of social inequality and economic polarisation. It 
was not that groups who rose up did not share the same social, educational, occupational or 
cultural spaces, or an outlook on accepting and valuing differences in society. The reality in 
2001 reflected failed multicultural, integration and social mobility policy, which resulted in a 
process of cultural withdrawal. A lack of cohesion is the outcome of wider processes in 
society, not the cause of factors perceived as the foundations of radicalism and later 
terrorism.  
 
Education is an essential vehicle for change, but education now also faces increasing 
securitisation. In the process, it stigmatises existing isolated individuals, especially in schools 
and in higher education settings (Abbas, 2018; Durodie, 2016; McGovern, 2016; Qurashi, 
2017). Prisons are another area of critical research, as they are networking and learning 
opportunities, as well as spaces targeted by certain radicalisers. Overcrowding and pre-trial 
detention spaces are also crucial issues. Those coming out of prisons endure implications for 
education and employment training. Beyond the UK, the remedy is not a counter-insurgency 
strategy, but the broader stability of the Middle East in general. In these spaces, a consensus 
is emerging, but gaps remain in understanding the subtleties of CVE and if they have any 
impact at all. This omission includes intervention and rehabilitation – i.e. detection, 
recruitment, assessment and evaluation, all involving many layers and levers, including 
schools, counter-narratives and the pre-criminal space. The concentration on the broad rather 
than the narrow is the foremost problem, where the broad refers to wider public-orientated 
elements and the narrow refers to ideology. Ideology is the tipping point. It takes in young 
people and it is through debunking ideology that they return to normalcy. However, it is 
separate from religiosity (Dawson and Amarasingam, 2016). 
 
Counterterrorism is the notion of an overarching framework that seeks to create a set of 
policies and interventions that deal with terrorism through active counter-narratives, as well 
as operational matters of security, policing and intelligence. Counter-extremism is the notion 
of building community resilience and capability to defend and counteract problematic 
characteristics affecting threats to national security. Young individuals in the process of 
donning a hijab or showing attitudinal changes regarding specific norms and values, once 
regarded as an acceptable reality of multiculturalism in the recent past, now face 
objectification. The lack of public engagement about ‘Prevent’ by the UK government creates 
disengagement on the part of the public with respect to the state. For Muslim communities 
who shoulder acute trials regarding their visibility and their negative representation in media 
and politics, in particular women (Chakraborti and Zempi, 2012), additional fears arise. In 
turn, voices who have little or no opposition or engagement from government or mainstream 
media fill the anti-‘Prevent’ vacuum.  
 
In the UK, elites divert awareness of Muslim groups within the context of the failings of 
globalisation. British Muslim groups and other new immigrant groups are a convenient 
scapegoat, as shown by the outcomes in the run up to and since the Brexit referendum of June 
2016. The wider context is neoliberal capitalism, where the motivations for crimes relating to 
radicalisation and terrorism are the options taken by individuals facing alienation, 
disenfranchisement and exclusion, where ideology acts as an accessible umbrella. Muslim 
groups rebel against global capitalism, racism and Islamophobia, which leads to a ‘moral 
panic’ that raises existing levels of Islamophobia but also affects aspects of the law, policing 
and securitisation. The media demonises certain groups, which benefits people in positions of 
power in support of the hegemonic discourse. It encourages the formation of subcultures as 
marginalised Muslim men face a crisis of masculinity, who then respond to their discontent 
by straining to re-establish their self-conceptualisation. The net outcome is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, ultimately conforming to the label attached to Muslim men – as well as Muslim 
women encountering radicalisation based on specific claims relating to Islamic femininity 
(Zakaria, 2015). 
 
As with other countries confronting the threats of violent extremism from groups of a radical 
Islamist or far right character, the oft-complex but perennial question is how to achieve the 
balance between individual freedom and national security. Effort is required to decouple the 
idea that radicalisation is always a security risk or that it will necessarily lead to violence or 
terrorism. The net result is a ‘disconnected citizenship’ that alienates religious and ethnic 
minority groups facing the toxic penalties of an enduring gaze upon them (Jarvis and Lister, 
2012). In reality, polarisation poses a greater threat than radicalisation, pitching indigenous 
minority and majority groups against each other. It results in ideological, cultural and 
political conflict rather than violent extremism or terrorism (Lub, 2013). The family is also 
crucial, although it is necessary to ensure that interest in this aspect does not promote the 
‘suspect community’ paradigm (Spalek, 2016).  
 
The ‘Prevent’ data published by the UK government on 9 November 2017 showed that the 
referrals from suspected Muslim extremists made up more than two-thirds of all referrals 
(Home Office, 2017). However, Muslim referrals to ‘Prevent’ are 41 more times likely than 
far right groups, given their population proportions. Far right individuals are six times more 
likely to get Channel support in London compared with Islamist individuals, yet Islamists 
make 72 per cent of all referrals in London compared with 2 per cent for far right groups. 
Carrying out a 2x2 chi-squared test, this result is significant at p < 0.01. Therefore, there is 
clearly a sense that the risks of radicalisation are more likely to be found within British 
Muslim communities and hence the need to ensure their greater scrutiny even though, 
evidently, far right extremism is on the rise. In reality, far right groups are increasingly 
committing acts of terrorism relative to their violent Islamist counterparts (Institute of 
Economics and Peace, 2017). The impact of the dysfunctionality of the ‘Prevent’ programme 
leads to a breakdown in trust, limiting the opportunities for engagement. However, the power 
of the state to define the problem and the solution is a limited means of policy development, 
which becomes an issue of authoritarian control rather than a social policy seeking to 
alleviate a problem grasped in collective terms. 
 
One immediate challenge is to determine the effectiveness or otherwise of ‘Prevent’ 
(Mirahmadi, 2016), which can help to establish the extent and limit of ‘Prevent’ in various 
settings, especially when it veers into matters of social cohesion (Aziz, 2014). A systematic 
independent evaluation of ‘Prevent’ policies across the UK can help to generate generalisable 
understandings that improve knowledge but also the ability to deliver effective policy, a 
process that is being on taken on by the Commission for Countering Extremism, although this 
is currently still in its infancy. Other research questions on ‘Prevent’ concern social and 
political contextualisation, measurement and evaluation, and the implications of wider 
counterterrorism policy. One type of violent extremism should not be a political or policy 
priority over other kinds, given the range, extent and impact of within-group violent 
extremisms. Questions also remain as to whether British citizens are safer due to ‘Prevent’. If 
the risk of violent extremism remains, does it mean that the policy has thus far been unable to 
deliver on its promise at all? It is discomforting that these questions remain unanswered in 
view of the effects it has on British Muslim-state relations and especially as ‘Prevent’ is the 
brand that the UK exports to the wider CVE world as a flagship model. 
 
Concluding Thoughts - Dismantling the ‘Prevent’ Logic 
The reality of Muslim communities is differentiation, not sameness. Uneven anxieties exist in 
cosmopolitan centres and the rest of the country – divided, as they are, into north and south as 
much as they are rich and poor. The apprehension facing British Muslim groups is a reality of 
social class, education, ethnicity, migration history and social and cultural capital mobilised 
since arrival and settlement. In parts of London, Muslim visibility is associated with cultural 
integration, while in the Midlands and in parts of the north, Muslim geographical prominence 
resonates with notions of cultural isolation. In the south, Muslims are expressing themselves 
through film, art, music, food and fashion, working alongside cosmopolitan elite groups due 
to their relatively privileged socio-economic status (Janmohamed, 2017). Elsewhere in the 
country, such differences are not as pronounced, if they are observable at all. However, low 
education results in low employment, causing patterns of social immobility, with groups 
trapped in the same areas in which the pioneer generations migrated and settled. It reproduces 
accusations of self-segregation and self-ghettoisation in the Midlands and the north. In the 
realm of politics, greater organisation and participation is found in London compared to a 
greater reliance on a pre-migration system of patrilineal clan kinship networks (biraderi) to 
bolster political mobilisation, which habitually ends in up a cul-de-sac due to the limited 
nature of its design and operationalisation in the diasporic context (Akhtar, 2013). All the 
main political parties take advantage of the biraderi structures, particularly with Pakistani 
communities in the midlands and in the north in the UK. 
 
Since 2010, the UK government has shut out the Muslim Council of Britain, the largest and 
most influential British Muslim umbrella group. It suggests British Muslim communities 
have to organise themselves in response to Islamophobia and radicalisation from below. In 
this self-organisation, British Muslims are required to take the lead in tackling both 
Islamophobia and radicalisation, not because they are specific Muslim problems, but rather 
that the state is incapable or unwilling to address the precise issues. Especially as current 
undertakings by the UK government to enhance existing counterterrorism legislation have led 
to accusations of a ‘pre-crime’ agenda (Altermark and Nilsson, 2018). Much involves behind-
the-scenes operations to pursue would-be terrorists, but the pressure to produce tangible 
deliverables leads to extensive politicisation of radicalisation, fuelling existing 
misunderstandings, and in the process granting licence to gross generalisations. It raises the 
prospect of ‘repoliticising counter-radicalisation’ as a means of active citizenship from below 
but ‘[w]hile there is resistance, change and transformation are possible’ (Croft, 2012: 232). 
Effective intervention needs to be sensitive to the background of every individual to 
understand where best to introduce it. It also means the depoliticisation of ‘Prevent’, 
especially when the approach conflates activism with extremism (Lowe, 2017). 
 
A left-realist critical criminological perspective suggests room for de-radicalisation 
programmes, but it needs to be community owned and led, which means that the present top-
down system of selection and processing of individuals for referrals needs to be democratic, 
open and transparent. British Muslims are under pressure because of the limitations to 
government domestic and foreign policy, but ‘Prevent’ has the consequence of widening 
divisions and creating additional mistrust. With a London-centric groupthink and the lack of 
any social science appreciation of communities in their settings, the status quo is preserved. 
The foremost impediment with the top-down ‘Prevent’ policy is that it is devoid of any real 
input from the Muslim communities affected by it – that is, apart from predetermined 
interlocutors straddling both communities. The other issue with ‘Prevent’ is the assumption 
that Islamist terrorism is akin to religious (mis)interpretation. It is a useful ruse on the part of 
commentators and policymakers as it takes attention away from the wider workings of 
society, including aspects of institutional, structural and cultural racism, which derives from 
as well as leads to Islamophobia. Terrorism is about the impact of the deed as a message of 
defiance of the voiceless; those left behind by the democratic process, those most pushed 
down by the workings of society, and those objectified as having the least to offer the rest of 
humanity.  
 
The decline in public services since austerity set it in in 2010 has plagued Britain. It has led 
the UK government to pay attention to a particular reading of the problem and the solution, 
taking matters back to a time when the general perspective on Islam and Muslims, 
specifically in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 and 7/7, was negatively converged on 
religion, culture and identity. The emergence of reactionary and dogmatic policies and 
programmes, demonising and vilifying a community of communities, shifts understanding 
away from specific checks on liberal democracies in the current era, projecting these 
concerns onto some of the most exposed and vulnerable groups in society. It is also necessary 
to see the perpetrators of acts of terrorism as victims – for reasons to do with the workings of 
society in general terms and because of the ways in which minority identities are shaped in a 
space where differences are challenged. A sense of persecution of a global faith community 
at the hands of supra-national interests in different parts of the world blights the judgements 
of young people with chequered personal histories and troubled lives. A spotlight only on 
vulnerabilities does not avoid the stigmatisation directed at entire communities and faith 
groups. It allows practitioners and policymakers to downgrade the holistic dynamics foremost 
in understanding and limiting violent extremism. It also prohibits different sections of British 
society to coalesce around themes that embrace the human condition as a collective, thus 
avoiding the deleterious consequences of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality. 
 
A left-realist criminological perspective can help to appreciate the nature of community 
perspectives on violence – from radicalisation to extremism to terrorism – but there remains a 
dearth of knowledge-building this area. Research in this area is needed in at least four 
different strands that require consideration. First, the importance of evaluating ‘Prevent’ 
externally to government is important in the light of the significance of this policy for state-
community relations. Second, the nature of these state-community relations need to be better 
understood considering the fissures that exist in the current period and the lack of any 
detailed assessment of them. Third, the nature of state, political and community relations in 
this area need greater understanding and clarity. Finally, there is a specific need to listen 
closely to perspectives of British Muslims and, in particular, what they regard as specific and 
important to help improve relations, thereby generating the confidence of communities while 
appreciating their capacity needs, in the process ensuring that government and policymakers 
are better able to bridge these vital communication and engagement openings. 
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